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The Incentives Approach to Judicial 
Retirement 
David R. Stras† 
The scholarly literature has not been kind to life tenure 
over the past fifteen years. Perhaps more than any other con-
stitutional provision, the Good Behavior Clause1 has been in 
the cross-hairs of conservative and liberal academics alike. Pro-
fessor Sai Prakash has labeled life tenure as “imperial,”2 argu-
ing that it creates a “home-grown” judicial “aristocracy.”3 Like-
wise, Professor Scot Powe has stated that “[l]ife tenure is the 
Framers’ greatest lasting mistake.”4 Professor L.H. LaRue has 
called the Good Behavior Clause “stupid.”5 In all, thirteen aca-
demics and one distinguished federal appellate judge have ar-
gued for the end of life tenure.6 Articles in the popular press 
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grate-
ful to Steve Calandrillo, Jim Chen, Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell, Tade Okediji, 
Mike Paulsen, and Ryan Scott for their comments and suggestions on an ear-
lier draft. I would also like to thank the participants in the Minnesota Law 
Review Symposium, who provided insightful comments on this Essay. This 
article also benefited from excellent research assistance provided by Karla 
Vehrs and Dan Ellerbrock. Of course, any errors in this Essay are my own. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 2. Saikrishna B. Prakash, America’s Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 583 
(1999) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM 
THE COURTS (1999)). 
 3. Id. at 573. 
 4. L.A. Powe, Jr., Old People and Good Behavior, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 
195, 196 (1995). 
 5. L.H. LaRue, “Neither Force Nor Will,” 12 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 179 
(1995). 
 6. See ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF 
RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 247 (2003); Steven G. 
Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES 15, 46–55 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); Paul 
D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Re-
turn to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra, at 467, available at 
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decrying life tenure have been appearing with greater fre-
quency since the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
and the regrettable death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist.7 
In this Essay, I do not attempt a principled defense of life 
tenure, which is the subject of considerable discussion in my 
forthcoming coauthored article.8 In that article, we make the 
case that life tenure helps to preserve the institutional legiti-
macy of the Court, both by producing more gradual change in 
the law and by reducing the risk that postjudicial service by 
Supreme Court Justices would jeopardize judicial independ-
ence.9 
In contrast, this Essay has three chief purposes. First, 
through a discussion and examination of existing judicial deci-
sion-making models, I will demonstrate that Justices do in fact 
act rationally in maximizing their own utility, even when they 
are seemingly constrained by Congressional preferences or 
stare decisis. Second, by manipulating the judicial utility func-
tion introduced by Judge Richard Posner in his seminal 1993 
article in the Supreme Court Economic Review,10 this Essay 
 
http://paulcarrington.com/Supreme%20Court%20Renewal%20Act.htm; David 
J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case 
for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1086 (2000); Sanford Levinson, 
Contempt of Court: The Most Important “Contemporary Challenge to Judging,” 
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 341 (1992); John J. McGinnis, Justice Without 
Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 541, 541–43 (1999); Henry Paul Monaghan, 
The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1212 
(1988); Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United 
States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 800–01 (1986); Powe, supra note 
4, at 197; Prakash, supra note 2, at 570–73; Laurence H. Silberman, Term 
Limits for Judges?, 13 J.L. & POL. 669, 687 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar & Steven 
G. Calabresi, Term Limits for the High Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at 
A23. 
 7. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Fusillades . . . and Tenure Traps, WASH. 
TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A14, available at http://www.washtimes.com/ 
commentary/20050705-092303-8036r.htm; Ken Bell, Lest Ye Be Judged, 
AUSTIN REV., July 6, 2005, at 4, available at http://www.austinreview 
.com/archives/2005/07/lest_ye_be_judg.html; Barry Ellington, Put Limits on 
Supreme Court Terms, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 10, 2005, at B8, available at 
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/0710sunlets103 
.html; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Life Tenure Is Too Long for Supreme Court Justices, 
37 NAT’L J. 2033, 2033–34 (2005). 
 8. See David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case 
for a “Golden Parachute”, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2006). 
 9. See id. at 1421–26. 
 10. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The 
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 31 (1993). 
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will propose a judicial retirement function that can be used to 
model the retirement decision of Justices. The function will 
permit scholars to make predictions about changes in retire-
ment behavior in response to a number of potential institu-
tional reforms of the Supreme Court, such as increases in work-
load or pension income. Third, this Essay will demonstrate that 
scholars who advocate “command and control” measures to con-
trol tenure, such as a mandatory retirement age or term limits, 
have been focusing on the wrong parts of the judicial retire-
ment function. 
Most proponents of a mandatory retirement age or term 
limits claim that we should amend the Constitution in order to 
alleviate the problems associated with life tenure. Their pro-
posals implicitly reject an incentives approach to retirement 
because they assume that Justices will not act rationally in re-
sponse to institutional modifications. In other words, both pro-
posals are not only radical in their scope and represent sub-
stantial constitutional change, but they also rely on the 
remarkable proposition that Justices are fundamentally differ-
ent from the rest of us in the way they approach economic deci-
sions. There is little evidence to commend this view, and there 
is considerable empirical research to the contrary that supports 
Judge Posner’s thesis that Justices maximize the same thing 
everybody else does: their own utility.11 Put simply, legal schol-
ars have not thought creatively about life tenure, shunning 
promising interdisciplinary approaches in favor of drastic con-
stitutional change. 
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I will summarize 
existing research, which reveals that Justices appear to act ra-
tionally in deciding cases. Political scientists have used the 
public papers of Justices to find support for the proposition that 
members of the Court decide cases based on their own policy 
preferences. In this Part, two models will be highlighted: the 
attitudinal model and the rational choice model. Predictably, 
these studies have sparked criticism from legal scholars, many 
of whom view the decisions of judges as substantially the prod-
uct of legal reasoning, precedent, and text.12 
 
 11. See id. at 39. 
 12. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: 
A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 
288–89 (1997) (reviewing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002)); Michael J. Gerhardt, 
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The theory that Justices act rationally in an area where 
they are arguably restrained—judicial decision making—
supports the hypothesis that they will act rationally in making 
other unconstrained choices, such as the decision to retire. Part 
II, therefore, will answer the criticism that Supreme Court Jus-
tices cannot be influenced by retirement incentives. While it is 
no doubt true that Supreme Court Justices are an exceptional 
group, the uniqueness of the position does not mean that Jus-
tices are unresponsive to economic incentives. To the contrary, 
the prestige and social status associated with the office of Su-
preme Court Justice are nothing more than sources of utility 
that must be overcome by other incentives in order to induce 
retirement.13 As numerous studies have shown, judges are ra-
tional people who make decisions based on their own utility 
function.14 Thus, like other economic decisions, the retirement 
decision can be modeled using factors identified in the empiri-
cal literature.15 Moreover, the most important of the retirement 
factors—income and workload—are also the most manipulable 
by Congress. My hope is that this model will allow us to better 
understand the retirement decision and to make more informed 
policy choices with respect to retirement and life tenure. 
I.  THE RATIONALITY OF THE JUDICIAL DECISION 
Beginning with the American legal realist movement of the 
1920s, scholars have been searching for alternatives to legal 
 
Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1734–35 (2003). 
 13. See Posner, supra note 10, at 31; Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1452–
54. 
 14. See Posner, supra note 10, at 31. 
 15. At least seven empirical studies have been conducted on the retire-
ment decisions of federal judges, including three that focus solely on Supreme 
Court Justices. See Deborah J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis 
of Turnover in the Lower Federal Courts, 1900-1987, 52 J. POL. 457 (1990); 
Timothy M. Hagle, Strategic Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on the 
United States Supreme Court, 15 POL. BEHAV. 25 (1993); David C. Nixon & J. 
David Haskin, Judicial Retirement Strategies: The Judge’s Role in Influencing 
Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 AM. POL. Q. 458 (2000); James F. 
Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573 (1995); Peverill 
Squire, Politics and Personal Factors in Retirement from the United States Su-
preme Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 180 (1988); Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and 
Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 1869–2002, 8 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2006); Christopher J. W. Zorn & Steven R. Van 
Winkle, A Competing Risks Model of Supreme Court Vacancies 1789-1992, 22 
POL. BEHAV. 145 (2000). 
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formalism to explain judicial decision making.16 Classical legal 
scholars viewed judges as “‘mechanical’ decision makers, who 
observe a similarity between cases, announce the rule of law 
inherent in the first case, and apply that rule to the second 
case.”17 In contrast, legal realists viewed precedent as “nothing 
more than [a] smoke screen[]” because it was simply unrealistic 
to view judges as neutral arbiters of the law, unswayed by their 
political and personal policy preferences.18 
In a 1948 book, political scientist Herman Pritchett at-
tempted an empirical verification of the legal realist critique.19 
Using data from 1937 to 1947, Pritchett examined dissents, 
concurrences, and voting blocs to determine why the norm of 
consensus had declined on the Supreme Court.20 If judges are 
neutral and mechanical arbiters of the law, then why do they 
reach different conclusions and write separate opinions? The 
answer, he said, was that Justices were not strictly following 
precedent, but instead were “motivated by their own prefer-
ences.”21 For the last fifty-eight years, political scientists have 
attempted to empirically prove Pritchett’s claim.22 
A. THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
One of the leading models among political scientists study-
ing the Supreme Court is the attitudinal model.23 It explains 
 
 16. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 12, at 87. 
 17. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 23 (1998) 
(citing EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4–5 (1949)). 
 18. See id. at 25 n.6 (citing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 
(1930)). 
 19. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948). 
 20. See id. at 25 tbl.1 (tracking the increasing number of nonunanimous 
opinions from eleven percent in 1930 to sixty-four percent in 1946, the rise of 
dissenting votes per opinion from .27 in 1930 to 1.71 in 1946, and the growing 
number of 5–4 opinions). 
 21. See id. at xiii. To be fair, Pritchett also identifies feuds among the Jus-
tices, the increasing number of “hard cases,” and review of novel and complex 
regulations as other reasons for the increasing divisions. See id. at 30–31. His 
work, however, is to be understood in the larger context of “acknowledging 
that the Supreme Court is a political institution performing a political func-
tion.” See id. at xiii.  
 22. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 24–25. 
 23. See Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurispru-
dence: New and Old Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 15, 15 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard 
Gillman eds., 1999); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empiri-
cal Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 
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judicial behavior by positing that judges decide cases in light of 
the facts of the case vis-à-vis their sincere ideology and voting 
preferences.24 Judges will act to advance their preferred policy 
preferences, regardless of other constraints such as precedent, 
text, or legislative intent.25 In other words, judges and Justices 
will act like any other political actor in pursing their own policy 
goals.26 
Proponents of the attitudinal model argue that, because of 
judicial independence, judges have more room than other po-
litical actors to “base their decisions solely upon personal policy 
preferences.”27 According to the theory, judges maximize their 
utility by deciding cases according to their own values and 
preferences.28 One might argue that this model is merely inten-
tionalist, but it also fits well within a rational actor framework 
because presumably Justices gain utility, or happiness, by 
maximizing their own policy preferences. For instance, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall seemingly gained utility by advancing 
the causes of underprivileged minorities.29 
Some legal scholars have responded to the attitudinal 
model cynically, either rejecting it outright or ignoring it all to-
gether. However, like the legal realists of the early twentieth 
century, many political scientists believe that the judicial opin-
 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 836. 
 24. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive The-
ory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 28 (1997). 
 25. See Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Postbehavioral-
ist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 606 (2000). 
 26. See id. 
 27. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION 
MAKING 72 (1976). 
 28. See Cross, supra note 12, at 265. 
 29. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (finding an affirmative action set-
aside program for minorities to be constitutionally permissible); U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional conception 
of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”). Justice Marshall’s 
commitment was equally clear. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 529 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a set-aside pro-
gram for minority-owned businesses should be upheld, in part to “rectify the 
scourge of past discrimination”); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 
450, 469 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to abolish caste legislation. When state action has the pre-
dictable tendency to entrap the poor and create a permanent underclass, that 
intent is frustrated.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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ion represents only an ex post method of justifying a decision 
based on the ideological proclivities of the judge.30 Political sci-
entists have observed that there is adequate room for judges to 
consider their policy preferences because the “Supreme Court 
has generated so much precedent that it is usually possible to 
find support for any conclusion.”31 
It is insufficient, of course, for political scientists to claim 
merely that judges have the ability to maneuver within the 
constraints imposed by precedent and external actors such as 
Congress. Over the past twenty years, a number of studies 
have gone further, demonstrating that judges, and particularly 
Supreme Court Justices, decide cases on the basis of their pol-
icy preferences and values.32 In the most comprehensive study 
of the attitudinal model to date, Professors Jeffrey Segal and 
Harold Spaeth examined all 217 of the Supreme Court’s search 
and seizure decisions from 1962 to 1998 in order to test the va-
lidity of the model.33 
Using newspaper editorials representing judgments about 
a Justice’s views on civil rights and liberties at the time of their 
nomination, the authors gave each Justice a numerical score, 
with -1 being “extremely conservative” and 1 being “extremely 
 
 30. See Cross, supra note 12, at 267; see also Jerome Frank, What Courts 
Do in Fact, 26 NW. U. L. REV. 645, 653 (1932) (referring to opinions as “ex post 
facto”); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
827, 865 (1988) (stating that “[w]e should not be so naïve as to infer the nature 
of the judicial process from the rhetoric of judicial opinions”). 
 31. LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A 
CHANGING AMERICA 21 (1995); see also Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Re-
sults and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 
1400 (1995) (echoing the sentiment of Epstein & Walker). 
 32. See, e.g., John B. Gates, Partisan Realignment, Unconstitutional State 
Policies, and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1837–1964, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259 
(1987); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); Segal, supra 
note 24. I would argue that delegation of the opinion-drafting function to 
clerks has only increased the propensity of Justices to decide cases based on 
their own policy preferences. In the past, when Justices were solely responsi-
ble for the written product, they were aware of instances when an opinion just 
would not write, often causing a switch in votes. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, 
The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutional-
ism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING, supra note 23, at 65. Now, with clerks doing much of the 
drafting, Justices do not become as familiar with the nuances of each case, in-
cluding the difficulties of aligning a new case with prevailing doctrine and 
other lines of decisions. 
 33. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 12, at 314. 
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liberal.”34 Predictably, Justice Scalia was the most conservative 
Justice according to their measure, earning a score of -1, while 
Justice Brennan was the most liberal, earning a score of 1.35 
With the facts of each case and the Justices’ attitudes as the 
independent variables, Segal and Spaeth measured the ex-
planatory power of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable of the decision reached in each case.36 The authors 
found that the predictive value of the independent variables on 
the dependent variable was strong, allowing them to predict 71 
percent of the individual Justices’ decisions.37 The results of 
their regression analysis led them to conclude that “the ideol-
ogy of the justices drives their decisions.”38 In a number of 
other areas, political scientists have found strong correlations 
between votes and the ideology of Justices, which appear to 
support the attitudinal model.39 Simply put, the attitudinalists 
believe that “Rehnquist vote[d] the way he d[id] because he 
[wa]s extremely conservative [and] Marshall voted the way he 
did because he [wa]s extremely liberal.”40 
The strength of the attitudinal model is in its “ability to 
muster quantitative evidence in its support.”41 Nevertheless, 
 
 34. See id. at 322. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. at 323. 
 37. See id. at 325. Just because the model does not explain 100 percent of 
the decisions made by Justices does not mean that they are acting irrationally 
29 percent of the time. Instead, it tends to demonstrate that other factors 
drive the decisions of the Court, including institutional constraints such as 
stare decisis and the preferences of Congress. As the rational choice model il-
lustrates, Justices might also garner utility from pleasing the other branches 
of government or applying the law as written. 
 38. Id. at 433; see also Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and 
Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843, 847 (1961) (finding that Democ-
ratic judges decided cases more liberally than Republican judges in the areas 
of criminal law, administrative law, civil liberties law, tax law, business rela-
tions law, and personal injury law). 
 39. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 12, at 325. 
 40. See id. at 86. In another book, Spaeth and Segal concluded that 
“precedent rarely influences United States Supreme Court justices.” HAROLD 
J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHER-
ENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 287 (1999). Under the atti-
tudinal model, Justices will rarely change their votes on the basis of prece-
dent. 
 41. Whittington, supra note 25, at 606; see also Frank B. Cross, The Jus-
tices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 529 (1998) (reviewing EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, 
supra note 17) (“There is strong attitudinal model evidence which shows that 
Justices consistently vote their policy preferences.”); Tracey George, Develop-
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legal scholars have identified several weaknesses of the model. 
One criticism is that it is difficult to create a model that meas-
ures legal variables, so it is possible that a decision that ap-
pears purely ideological at first glance may actually be based 
upon legal authority.42 Put another way, the attitudinal model 
cannot rule out the possibility that legal considerations and 
personal policy preferences are collinear variables in many 
cases. It would not be surprising, for example, if Justices who 
subscribe to originalism as an interpretive method reach con-
servative outcomes much of the time. 
Further, even if the model does not overstate the explana-
tory power of personal values and preferences,43 it fails to ex-
plain the other 29 percent of the cases that cannot be predicted 
by the facts of the cases or the policy preferences of the Jus-
tices. This failure is critical because much of the coding of the 
data was done in a subjective manner, including the charac-
terization of a Justice’s ideology.44 
A third, more fundamental, criticism of the attitudinal 
model is that Justices derive utility or happiness from sources 
 
ing a Positive Theory of Judicial Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1653 (1998) (“The attitudinal model endures because em-
pirical studies have demonstrated that it has substantial explanatory power.”). 
 42. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 12, at 291; see also Clayton, supra 
note 23, at 25 (“Segal and Spaeth’s evidence that Justices consistently vote to 
support certain policy positions does not demonstrate that they do so because 
of personal policy preferences.”); Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 1746 (stating that 
the data in Segal and Spaeth’s book does not show that “legal variables are not 
factors in the justices’ decisions”). Professors Cross and Clayton have also 
criticized the attitudinal model based upon political scientists’ cramped view of 
legal variables. See Clayton, supra note 23, at 27–28; Cross, supra note 12, at 
291. 
 43. Professor Heise has argued that the research design of many of these 
studies “may over emphasize [sic] the role of ideology as a predictor of judicial 
decisions.” Heise, supra note 23, at 838. Because the Supreme Court tends to 
hear the hard, close cases on which the lower courts are divided, the “selection 
effect might skew findings of ideology’s importance” at the Supreme Court 
level. Id. at 839; see also Cross, supra note 12, at 285 (stating that in the close 
cases heard by the Court, it is more likely that ideology will play a role); 
Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 1741 (reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 12, 
and stating that Segal and Spaeth discount the fact that the Court decides 
hard cases). 
 44. See Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 1749. As Professor Gerhardt points 
out, there are problems with determining ideology from newspaper editorials, 
including the concerns associated with ideological drift of Justices over time. 
See id. at 1749, 1753; see also Clayton, supra note 23, at 25 (“To begin with, 
newspaper editorials and past voting records provide only indirect measures of 
the justices’ personal policy preferences.”). 
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other than satisfying their policy preferences. Justices may “try 
to maximize other interests, including preserving leisure time, 
desire for prestige, promoting the public interest, avoiding hav-
ing their decisions overturned, or enhancing reputation.”45 For 
Supreme Court Justices in particular, the intangible benefits 
from judging—including prestige and social status—are likely 
to be as significant as considerations of policy.46 Professor Cross 
has recognized that judges might even derive utility from a 
“sense of duty” in applying the law fairly and faithfully.47 Yet 
the attitudinal model only takes into account the influence of 
policy preferences on judicial decision making, ignoring many 
other relevant factors. 
Thus, while “[t]he search for a single maximand . . . is 
probably fruitless,”48 the attitudinal model supports the hy-
pothesis that judges are rational actors who attempt to maxi-
mize their own utility.49 
B. THE RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL 
Another theory about judicial decision making that is per-
haps more realistic, yet less empirically verifiable, is the ra-
tional choice model. Under that model, judges are assumed to 
be seekers of legal policy, but they are also “strategic actors 
who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on 
a consideration of the preferences of others, of the choices they 
expect others to make, and of the institutional context in which 
they act.”50 In other words, the decisions of Justices can best be  
 
 
 45. Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 1751. For example, a Justice that is con-
cerned about enhancing her own prestige or reputation may decide a case that 
is contrary to her own policy preferences in order to show that she is inde-
pendent from her colleagues that subscribe to a similar ideology. 
 46. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1454. 
 47. Cross, supra note 12, at 296. 
 48. Id. at 302. 
 49. See Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Insti-
tutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING, supra note 23, at 43, 45 (describing the influence of “ra-
tional-choice analysis” on the attitudinal model). 
 50. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at xiii. Although Epstein and 
Knight are among the most prominent rational choice theorists today, the 
model has its beginnings in a 1964 book by Walter Murphy and a 1958 article 
by Glendon Schubert. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL 
STRATEGY (1964); Glendon A. Schubert, The Study of Judicial Decision-
Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1007 (1958). 
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explained as the choices of strategic actors attempting to maxi-
mize their utility, not simply as Justices maximizing utility 
through reactive, nonstrategic ideological responses to a set of 
facts.51 One of the major advantages of the rational choice ap-
proach is that it does not rule out the possibility that judges are 
motivated by goals other than policy.52 
The strategic considerations include not only the predicted 
actions of colleagues, but also the views of external bodies such 
as the executive and legislative branches of government.53 If 
Justices are concerned about seeing their policy preferences or 
other goals prevail, then “goal-oriented justices [must] concern 
themselves with the positions of Congress, the president and 
the public.”54 If Congress, for example, disapproves of the 
Court’s decisions, then it can overturn them through legislation 
or even implement a court-curbing measure.55 The rational 
choice model also does a better job than the attitudinal model 
at explaining choices made by Justices at points other than the 
decision on the merits, such as at the certiorari and opinion-
writing stages. 
 
 51. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 10. 
 52. To be sure, Professor Cross criticizes Epstein and Knight for illogically 
concluding that Justices are motivated solely by policy preferences. See Cross, 
supra note 41, at 533–34. While this is no doubt a valid criticism of their ap-
proach, Professors Cross, Epstein and Knight admit that rational choice the-
ory can be based on maximizing goals other than policymaking. See EPSTEIN & 
KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 11–12; Cross, supra note 41, at 540–41. 
 53. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 13; Maltzman et al., supra 
note 49, at 46. Unlike the attitudinal model, the rational choice model takes 
into account the norm of stare decisis. Because it is an institutional constraint, 
stare decisis may require “judges to compromise on their preferences in order 
to make their decision consistent with existing precedent,” and violations of 
that norm can “be costly to a potentially rebellious judge.” Whittington, supra 
note 25, at 612. 
 54. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 14. 
 55. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1460. On many occasions, Congress 
has applied informal pressure on the Court by entertaining various types of 
“Court-curbing legislation,” including, for example, withdrawing the Court’s 
jurisdiction over certain matters, requiring extraordinary majorities to strike 
down legislation on constitutional grounds, and removing the power of judicial 
review. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Politi-
cal Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 376–78 (1992) (“Attacking the Court is an old 
congressional practice dating back to the early years of the nation.”); see also 
Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 
925, 926 (1965). The most infamous example is President Roosevelt’s Court-
packing plan, but there have been dozens of more modest examples. See Nagel, 
supra, at 926. 
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Some of the most powerful evidence in support of the ra-
tional choice model can be found in the Justices’ behavior at the 
certiorari stage. Professors Epstein and Knight discovered, for 
example, that “aggressive grants” and “defensive denials” can 
be explained by strategic behavior.56 An aggressive grant oc-
curs when at least four Justices vote to take a case that may 
not warrant review because the case will likely be decided in 
those Justices’ favor, allowing them to shape the doctrine in a 
certain direction.57 A defensive denial, by contrast, occurs when 
Justices deny certiorari on a case that may warrant review be-
cause they believe that their policy preferences will not prevail 
at the merits stage.58 A study of the 1982 Term of the Supreme 
Court revealed strong evidence of policy voting and strategic 
behavior by Justices at the certiorari stage.59 
Strategic behavior, however, extends beyond the certiorari 
stage. Epstein and Knight discuss a number of examples where 
the opinion assignment decision can be determinative of the 
tenor and scope of the opinion.60 One common strategy is to as-
sign the opinion to the “most tentative member of the majority 
in hopes of avoiding a switch of that justice’s vote.”61 Other 
strategies include assigning the opinion to a strategically adept 
Justice or to one that has a position that is very close to the as-
signing Justice in order to avoid a weak opinion.62 
Once the opinion is assigned, coalition building becomes 
the next important strategic node. Epstein and Knight rely on 
the conference notes of Justices Brennan and Powell to show 
that the intermediate level of scrutiny that is applied to gender 
discrimination claims was a product of compromise among the 
Justices in the majority coalition.63 In Craig v. Boren,64 three 
 
 56. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 80. 
 57. See id. (citing H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 208 (1991)). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping 
in the Supreme Court, 15 J. LAW, ECON., & ORG. 549, 570 (1999); see also 
Robert L. Boucher & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic De-
cision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 
57 J. POL. 824, 836 (1995) (finding that Justices during the Vinson Court en-
gaged in aggressive grants but not defensive denials). 
 60. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 127. 
 61. Cross, supra note 41, at 517. 
 62. See id. at 518. 
 63. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 4–7. 
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Justices (Brennan, Marshall, and White) preferred to apply 
strict scrutiny, one Justice (Stevens) favored a standard above 
rational basis review, and the final Justice in the coalition 
(Stewart) desired rational basis review for claims of gender dis-
crimination.65 Because these were the only five Justices that 
believed there was standing at the time of conference, Justice 
Brennan assigned the opinion to himself and drafted it with the 
goal of persuading Justice Stewart.66 By adopting intermediate 
or “heightened” review, “Brennan put together a majority be-
hind a standard for gender discrimination that has survived to 
this day.”67 Likewise, the opinion in Baker v. Carr68 was shaped 
by the need to persuade Justice Stewart to join the majority 
opinion.69 Under the strategic model, the “swing” or “fifth” Jus-
tice carries the most power on the Court.70 Put another way, 
strategic Justices will adopt compromise solutions rather than 
risk losing a majority, resulting in a holding that could be fur-
ther from their optimal policy choices. 
Like the attitudinal model, the rational choice model is not 
immune from criticism. To the extent that Epstein and Knight 
focus almost exclusively on ideology and policy, the rational 
choice model suffers from some of the same weaknesses as the 
attitudinal model.71 For instance, with respect to the certiorari 
process, some scholars have discovered, after interviewing the 
Justices, that the “Court acts much less strategically” at that 
stage than many political scientists believe.72 Of course, much 
of this evidence can be discounted because the Justices have an 
incentive to make the process appear as impartial as possible to 




 64. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 65. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 8 tbls.1–4. 
 66. Cross, supra note 41, at 520. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 69. Cross, supra note 41, at 521 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: 
HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 222 (1996)). 
 70. See id. at 521; Whittington, supra note 25, at 611 (“A simple spatial 
model would indicate that Court decisions should reflect the preferences of the 
median justice on any given issue, the pivotal swing justice.”). 
 71. See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text. 
 72. PERRY, supra note 57, at 144 (1991); see also DORIS MARIE PROVINE, 
CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 130 (1980). 
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Moreover, as a former Supreme Court clerk, I find it hard 
to believe that most Justices are motivated solely by their own 
policy preferences. Even if a Justice has little regard for stare 
decisis, most at least adhere to a particular interpretive meth-
odology that requires some degree of legal precision. As Frank 
Cross notes, Justices should be at a “complete loss” to decide 
cases that “lack ideological or political import” if advancing pol-
icy is their singular focus.73 In cases involving little ideological 
significance, most Justices apply precedent or their own inter-
pretive method to reach a legally justified result.74 Moreover, 
the “mere fact that the Court grants certiorari to review such 
nonideological cases demonstrates the power of legal con-
cerns.”75 
I believe that policy plays a role in the decisions of the Su-
preme Court, but it combines with a number of other considera-
tions, including legal constraints such as stare decisis, to shape 
the decision-making process. As Professor Cross states, 
“[r]ational choice analysis can apply where the actors pursue 
multiple goals.”76 Elsewhere I have outlined a number of other 
goals for judges, labeled “the intangible benefits of judging.”77 
Prestige and social status are an important part of the utility 
function for Justices.78 Of course, at a minimum, an ostensible 
commitment to legal analysis is an important part of maintain-
ing the reputational prestige associated with the position. For 
instance, a Justice who writes his or her opinions without cita-
tion to legal authority would lose respect and status within the 
legal community, even if the legal analysis only serves as a fa-
çade to mask naked policy preferences. 
 
 73. Cross, supra note 41, at 542. 
 74. We must not forget that Justices are subject to institutional con-
straints and context that require them to adhere to certain norms and tradi-
tions of the Supreme Court. As Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman have 
pointed out, “With respect to Supreme Court politics, . . . justices’ behavior 
might be motivated not only by a calculation about prevailing opportunities 
and risks but also by a sense of duty or obligation about their responsibilities 
to the law and the Constitution and by a commitment to act as judges rather 
than as legislators or executives.” Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman, Be-
yond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-
Making, in ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 27, at 1, 5. 
 75. Cross, supra note 41, at 542. 
 76. Id. at 546. 
 77. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1453–54. 
 78. See Posner, supra note 10, at 13–15. 
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C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISIONAL MODELS 
The strong empirical support for the attitudinal and ra-
tional choice models substantiates Judge Posner’s claim that 
“[j]udges are rational, and they pursue instrumental and con-
sumptive goals of the same general kind and in the same gen-
eral way that private persons do.”79 As the foregoing discussion 
shows, Justices act rationally in deciding cases, which is the 
area most subject to internal and external institutional con-
straints such as congressional preferences, rules of the Court, 
and stare decisis. In contrast, Justices are almost entirely un-
restrained in the decision of when and whether to retire,80 
which suggests that Justices are free to maximize their own 
utility in making that decision. 
To many law and economics scholars and political scien-
tists, the assertion that Justices act rationally in making judi-
cial decisions is entirely unexceptional, possibly even tautologi-
cal. But some legal scholars believe that rational actor models 
have no place in the study of the Supreme Court, perhaps be-
cause of the perceived idiosyncrasies of Justices or devotion to 
the legal model.81 Although there are admittedly some prob-
lems with the attitudinal and rational choice models, as I ex-
plain above, political scientists have been applying those mod-
els to judicial decision making for about half a century, and in 
so doing, have made some important discoveries. 
My goal in this Essay is to take that research a step fur-
ther by showing that an economic or incentives approach to the 
retirement decision of Supreme Court Justices is likely to suc-
ceed. If Justices act rationally in deciding cases, it appears 
that, a fortiori, they would act to maximize their utility in mak-
ing inherently personal decisions such as whether to write a 
 
 79. Id. at 39. 
 80. One informal institutional norm is that Justices tend to retire so as to 
avoid two simultaneous vacancies on the Supreme Court. See WARD, supra 
note 6, at 21 (“[T]wo justices rarely depart at the same time.”); Eric Black, The 
O’Connor Retirement: The Battle Ahead, STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), July 2, 2005, 
at A6. Nonetheless, the only decision placed squarely within the prerogative of 
a judge under Article III is the decision of when and whether to retire by vir-
tue of the Good Behavior Clause. 
 81. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Prece-
dent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 912 (2005) (“Some law professors . . . have lev-
eled a number of critiques of the . . . rational choice model.”); E-mail from 
David J. Garrow to author (Aug. 25, 2005) (on file with author). 
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book,82 accept speaking engagements, and, of course, whether 
and when to retire. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING THE RETIREMENT DECISION 
In recent years, a number of political scientists have looked 
to the rational choice model to explain the retirement behavior 
of Justices.83 Although there is not, as of yet, any uniform 
model to explain the factors influencing the retirement decision 
of Justices, a number of empirical studies have identified the 
most important historical considerations. Elsewhere I have 
highlighted some of them, emphasizing in particular the role of 
economic factors.84 
In this Part, I will take the existing research one step fur-
ther by synthesizing the most important factors identified in 
these empirical studies. Judge Posner’s approach in his 1993 
article identifying and analyzing the principal elements of the 
judicial utility function will provide the blueprint for my analy-
sis.85 Using Judge Posner’s analysis as a guide, I will algebrai-
cally model a Justice’s retirement function, and then describe 
the most influential considerations in the decision of an aver-
age Justice. Of course, each Justice will weigh the relevant fac-
tors differently, but a better understanding of the considera-
tions influencing judicial retirement will allow us to make 
better policy choices about judicial tenure and institutional re-
form. 
A. THE JUDICIAL UTILITY FUNCTION 
In 1993, Judge Richard Posner wrote an influential article 
in which he modeled the utility function for “federal appellate 
 
 82. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote several books during his time on the 
Court, as did Justice O’Connor. See, e.g., SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, CHICO 
(2005); SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A 
CATTLE RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (2002); SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, 
THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
(2003); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME (1998); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED 
ELECTION OF 1876 (2004); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE 
HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT 
ANDREW JOHNSON (1992); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 
(2002). 
 83. See supra note 15. 
 84. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1447–49. 
 85. See Posner, supra note 10, at 31–39. 
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judges.”86 He first analogized the federal appellate judge to 
various other types of actors: to managers of nonprofit enter-
prises, voters in political elections, and spectators at theatrical 
performances.87 These analogies led him to “present a simple 
model in which judicial utility is a function mainly of income, 
leisure, and judicial voting.”88 He then used the model to ex-
plain various judicial behaviors, ranging from adherence to 
stare decisis to the phenomenon of “go-along voting” observed 
on many three-judge panels.89 The model yielded some interest-
ing insights.90 
Posner’s judicial utility function is represented by the fol-
lowing equation: 
U = U(tj, tl, I, R, O) 
. . . [where] tj is the number of hours per day that a judge devotes to 
judging, tl is the time he devotes to leisure, . . . I is pecuniary income, 
. . . R is reputation, and O represents the other sources of judicial util-
ity . . . besides that of judicial voting itself—popularity, prestige, and 
avoiding reversal.91 
According to Judge Posner, rational judicial actors will al-
locate their time so that the last hour devoted to judging will 
yield the same utility as the last hour devoted to leisure.92 
Of far more interest, however, at least for purposes of this 
Essay, is Judge Posner’s manipulation of the judicial utility 
function to model the decision of whether to accept an Article 
III judgeship in the first instance.93 He begins with the obvious 
proposition that an individual will accept a nomination if the 
change in net expected utility for the career change is positive.  
 
 
 86. Id. at 4. 
 87. See id. at 2. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Some scholars have criticized the variables selected by Judge Posner 
for his judicial utility function because they are not supported by empirical 
evidence. See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of Dispositionism: 
The Premature Demise of Situationist Law & Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 24, 58 
n.130 (2005); Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective 
Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 988–994 (1995). In contrast to Judge 
Posner’s approach, my retirement function is a product of the empirical litera-
ture, so the criticisms of Benforado, Hanson, and Cass are inapposite here. 
 91. See Posner, supra note 10, at 31. 
 92. See id. Otherwise, judges would increase their utility “by reallocating 
time from the less to the more valuable activity.” Id. 
 93. See id. at 34–36. 
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In other words, a person will accept an Article III judgeship if 
the following inequality holds: 
Uj(tj, tl, Ij, Rj, Pj) – UL(tL, IL) – C > 0 
Assuming that a prospective judicial candidate is coming 
from private practice, “Uj is the utility from being a judge, Ij is 
the judicial salary, Pj is the prestige of being a judge, UL is the 
utility of practicing law, tL is the time a lawyer spends working, 
[and] C is the cost of becoming a judge.”94 The cost of becoming 
a judge would include, among other considerations, the incon-
venience and the loss of privacy in undergoing an investigation 
by the FBI and a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.95 A judicial candidate will accept the nomination if the util-
ity from judging is greater than the utility from private practice 
plus the costs of becoming a judge. 
The inequality is useful because it allows us to better un-
derstand the relevant decisional considerations for a prospec-
tive judicial nominee. For instance, the more a candidate val-
ues leisure (assuming that being a judge provides more leisure 
than private practice), prestige, and judging, the greater the 
probability the individual accepts the judgeship. Likewise, the 
more the candidate values money and lawyering, the greater 
the probability the individual remains in private practice.96 
B. THE JUDICIAL RETIREMENT FUNCTION 
A judge’s decision whether to retire is largely the converse 
of the decision of whether to accept a judgeship.97 Instead of 
gaining prestige and social status, for example, a retiring judge 
is in part forfeiting those accoutrements of office. However, the 
two decisions are not precisely symmetrical. For instance, there 
are few nonopportunity costs associated with making the tran-
 
 94. Id. at 35. 
 95. See id. Judge Posner’s model focuses only on the decision to become a 
federal judge straight from private practice. Of course, many federal judges 
served in other roles prior to their elevation, including as state court judges or 
academics, so the relevant factors may be weighed differently in those cases. 
 96. Judge Posner makes a number of additional interesting observations 
about the decision of whether to accept a judgeship, which are too numerous to 
recount here. See id. at 34–36. 
 97. Some federal judges retire completely, but the vast majority of them 
choose to continue on in a limited capacity as a senior judge. See Albert Yoon, 
As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of Judicial 
Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 497 (2005).  
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sition from active to senior status, unlike the case for accepting 
a judgeship.98 In addition, the empirical literature has identi-
fied a number of other factors in the retirement decision that 
are nowhere to be found in Judge Posner’s judicial utility func-
tion, including health and strategic considerations.99 Using the 
approach employed by Judge Posner, a judge will take senior 
status if the following inequality holds: 
US(tj, tl, IS, PS, S, HS, OS) – UA(tJ, tL, PA, HA, OA) > 0 
Although each of the factors will be discussed in greater 
detail below, US is the total utility from senior status, which in-
cludes hours per day devoted to leisure (tl) and to judging (tj), 
pension income from senior status (IS), prestige from serving as 
a senior judge (PS), strategic benefits from electing senior 
status (S), health status as a senior judge (HS), and other fac-
tors relating to senior status (OS). Meanwhile, UA is the total 
utility from active status, which includes time devoted to lei-
sure (tL) and to judging (tJ), salary income from active status 
(IA), prestige from serving as an active judge (PA), health status 
as an active judge (HA), and other factors relating to being an 
active judge (OA). 
1. Time Constraints 
The first set of factors in both utility functions is the time 
spent on judging and leisure, which in large part depends on 
the workload associated with both positions. Due to the modest 
workload requirements for senior judges, judges who value 
their leisure time will find senior status attractive.100 Senior 
judges may work as little or as much as they wish, subject only 
to the constraint that they must perform the equivalent of at 
least three months of the work of “an average judge in active 
service” during a calendar year.101 Thus, judges who seek 
 
 98. For instance, the transition from active to senior status is not accom-
panied by the loss of privacy associated with an FBI investigation and a Sen-
ate hearing. 
 99. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 100. Federal judges may elect to take senior status or fully retire with a 
pension once they satisfy the “rule of eighty,” which is “a sliding scale of age or 
service, beginning at age sixty-five and fifteen years of service, and ending at 
age seventy with ten years of service.” Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1444. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1)(A) (2000). Congress introduced a certification 
process for senior judges in 1989. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-194, § 705(a), 103 Stat. 1716, 1770. There are other ways to satisfy the 
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greater flexibility in their work schedules will also be more 
likely to elect senior status immediately upon becoming eligi-
ble. 
As Judge Posner has acknowledged, judges receive pleas-
ure from the act of judging as well as the time they spend on 
leisure activities.102 It might be argued that Justices enjoy the 
act of judging so much that they are hesitant to retire. The ju-
dicial retirement function demonstrates, however, that the de-
cision to retire is more complex than simply asserting that Jus-
tices must really like judging. There are a number of other 
factors to consider, including income, strategic considerations, 
workload, and prestige. Indeed, if Justices received dispropor-
tionate utility from the process of voting and deciding cases, 
then the Supreme Court’s docket would continue to grow and a 
higher workload would be a disincentive to retire. And if the at-
titudinal model is correct, Justices should have a particular de-
sire to see their policy preferences prevail. Yet the Supreme 
Court’s docket has been shrinking precipitously over the past 
fifteen years, and retirements have been sparse during that pe-
riod.103 
Although less research exists about workload than other 
factors influencing the retirement decisions of federal judges, at 
least one study has concluded that a higher workload increases 
the probability of retirement.104 Using each month on the ap-
pellate bench as a separate observation,105 Professors Nixon 
and Haskin used regression analysis to model the retirement 
decision. The study defined workload “as the number of case fil-
ings per judge.”106 Both individual and longitudinal analysis 
confirmed that “personal factors such as workload . . . are the 
most substantively and statistically significant factors affecting 
 
certification requirement apart from purely judicial work, including perform-
ing “substantial duties for a Federal or State governmental entity,” which 
demonstrates the flexibility of senior status. See David R. Stras & Ryan W. 
Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
Mar. 2007) (manuscript at 9, on file with author) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 
371(e)(1)(D)).  
 102. See Posner, supra note 10, at 16, 18–20. 
 103. See Margaret Meriweather Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme 
Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 738 (2001); Arthur D. 
Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
403, 403–04. 
 104. See Nixon & Haskin, supra note 15, at 471–72. 
 105. See id. at 465. 
 106. Id. at 466. 
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aggregate retirements.”107 At least two other studies of lower 
court judges have confirmed the positive impact of increased 
workload on judicial retirements.108 
These studies suggest that increasing the workload of Jus-
tices, which in turn increases the amount of time spent on judg-
ing rather than leisure, will make retirement more attractive 
for the average Justice.109 Rather than abolishing life tenure, 
as many academics have proposed, increasing the workload of 
the Court is a modest, tailored reform that holds substantial 
promise.110 
2. Income 
Unlike the decision to accept a judgeship, income is essen-
tially an offsetting variable in the judicial retirement function, 
meaning that there is little economic advantage (or disadvan-
tage) in retiring from active status. In most cases, judicial pen-
sions are approximately equal to the salaries earned by active  
 
 
 107. Id. at 480. Case filings per judge tends to be the most accurate meas-
ure of the “true monthly workload” of appellate judges. See id. at 486 n.8. In 
contrast, other studies of Supreme Court retirement behavior have either 
omitted the workload variable entirely or used measures such as the number 
of majority or dissenting opinions, which might be more of a proxy for physical 
or mental infirmity than the true workload of an average Justice. See, e.g., 
Squire, supra note 15, at 186; Zorn & Van Winkle, supra note 15, at 156. 
 108. Spriggs and Wahlbeck’s 1995 study found that “expansion in workload 
. . . affects judicial retirements,” but that the “estimate is statistically signifi-
cant [only] for Republicans . . . not for Democrats.” See Spriggs & Wahlbeck, 
supra note 15, at 590. Similarly, Barrow and Zuk concluded that “the cumula-
tive effect of caseload on retirement from the circuit court [wa]s substantial.” 
See Barrow & Zuk, supra note 15, at 469. 
 109. In a future paper, I will argue that one of the most important benefits 
of increasing the workload of the Supreme Court is its potential to encourage 
mentally or physically infirm Justices to retire, before they become a substan-
tial burden on the Court and their colleagues. I will argue that workload 
should be increased by: (1) reinstituting circuit riding during the summer 
months; and (2) restoring nondiscretionary jurisdiction for certain types of 
cases. 
 110. Modifying the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is among the powers 
vested in Congress by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all 
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Ju-
risdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make.” (emphasis added)); see also Edward 
Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After 
the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649–57 (2000) (explaining Con-
gress’s role in the evolution from mandatory appellate jurisdiction to certiorari 
jurisdiction for the Supreme Court). 
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judges, except that the pensions of senior judges are exempt 
from FICA taxes and the income taxes of many states.111 In-
deed, senior judges continue to share in any raises given to 
their active colleagues by Congress.112 In other words, income 
plays an insignificant role in the current retirement decision.113 
It is true that Justices have an opportunity to make sub-
stantial income after retiring from judging. For example, sev-
eral current Justices have signed lucrative book deals and oth-
ers, such as Justice Scalia, earn extra money by teaching 
classes.114 Meanwhile, some hypothesize that fully retired Jus-
tices have an opportunity to enter into private practice and 
make millions of dollars as experienced advocates,115 even 
though none have done so in recent memory.116 While I do not 
dismiss these potential income streams, they are highly unpre-
dictable. For instance, an active Justice is probably better 
equipped to sign a profitable book deal than a senior or retired 
Justice that has left the public spotlight. Likewise, neither ac-
tive nor senior Justices can practice law while continuing to de-
cide cases.117 Thus, while I do not dismiss these possibilities, 
 
 111. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1453. 
 112. See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-713, § 371, 62 Stat. 869, 869 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (mandating that any Justice 
who retires from active service after reaching the age of seventy and after 
serving ten years continuously shall receive the salary of the office). 
 113. Early in this nation’s history, a number of Justices remained on the 
Supreme Court, despite suffering from incapacitating physical or mental dis-
abilities, due in large part to the absence of a pension for retiring Article III 
judges. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1439–40. Justices Baldwin and 
Cushing, for example, both stayed on the Supreme Court in order to continue 
drawing a salary. See id. at 1440. In other words, income plays a role in the 
retirement decisions of Supreme Court Justices, but that role is not as signifi-
cant under the current retirement regime. 
 114. See, e.g., Gina Holland, Five Justices Worth Millions: New Financial 
Reports Detail the Supreme Court Members’ Book Deals and Other Assets, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, June 6, 2004, at A10; Tony Mauro, Book Club, LEGAL TIMES, 
June 7, 2004, at 4. 
 115. For example, one participant in this symposium, Dean Kenneth Starr, 
left his judgeship on the D.C. Circuit and eventually entered private practice 
with the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis after four years as Solicitor General. See 
Tony Mauro, Pepperdine Law School’s Newest Star, LEGAL TIMES, April 12, 
2004, at 19. 
 116. Even lower court judges, who have less prestigious positions than Su-
preme Court Justices, are “reluctan[t] to seek work outside the judiciary.” 
Yoon, supra note 97, at 538. 
 117. See Federal Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 601, 103 
Stat. 1716, 1760 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 502 (2000) (prohibit-
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they are difficult to measure in the judicial retirement function. 
Even though Justices have been reluctant to fully retire 
from the judiciary and the income received by senior and active 
Justices is approximately the same, I do not remove the income 
variable from the retirement function because Congress has the 
power to create substantial monetary retirement incentives 
through pension reform. In a recent coauthored article, we ex-
amined the strong relationship between financial considera-
tions and the retirement decision.118 Nearly every study focus-
ing on Supreme Court Justices has found that pensions were 
among the most important predictors of retirement.119 Profes-
sor Squire’s study demonstrated that the two most important 
variables affecting a Justice’s decision to retire are health con-
siderations and pension eligibility.120 Meanwhile, in Zorn & 
Van Winkle’s study, “pension eligibility increased the baseline 
hazard for retirement by an astounding 393 [percent].”121 
In other words, “judges appear to recognize—at least im-
plicitly—the judicial compensation structure and how best to 
maximize it.”122 Elsewhere I have proposed that Congress enact 
a “golden parachute” for Supreme Court Justices upon satisfy-
ing the rule of 80.123 The pension annuity offered to senior Jus-
tices would be double the salary of active Justices, providing a 
substantial financial incentive to retire.124 For instance, the 
present value of the retirement incentive for a sixty-five year 
old Justice under our plan is over $1.5 million, assuming cur-
rent life expectancies.125 Indeed, the “golden parachute” can 
even imitate a mandatory retirement age or term limits by ex-
empting the pension income from all federal income taxes if 
Justices elect senior status within a short window after having 
served for a certain term of years or upon reaching a certain 
 
ing judges from providing professional services that involve a fiduciary rela-
tionship). 
 118. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1447–52. 
 119. See Squire, supra note 15, at 186–87; Yoon, supra note 15, at 40–41; 
Zorn & Van Winkle, supra note 15, at 154–55. 
 120. Squire, supra note 15, at 186. 
 121. Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1448 (citing Zorn & Van Winkle, supra 
note 15, at 155). 
 122. Yoon, supra note 15, at 43. 
 123. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1458–59. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 1457–58. 
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age.126 Like workload modifications, increasing judicial pen-
sions would have a demonstrable effect on the retirement deci-
sion of the average Justice. 
3. Prestige and the Intangible Benefits of Judging 
The least empirically measurable variable in the retire-
ment decision of Supreme Court Justices is the prestige and so-
cial status associated with the position.127 As Professors Steven 
Calabresi and James Lindgren have recently explained, the “so-
cial status associated with being a [Supreme Court J]ustice” 
has improved over time, encouraging many Justices to stay on 
the bench for longer periods of time.128 Professor Albert Yoon 
recently conducted a survey of senior judges, in which many 
explained that being a judge was prestigious, intellectually 
stimulating, and an important factor in their continued happi-
ness.129 
The implications of Professor Yoon’s research are obvious. 
When Supreme Court Justices transition into senior status, 
they lose much of the prestige and social status associated with 
the position. Unlike senior judges in the lower federal courts, 
senior Justices can no longer participate in the Court’s busi-
ness: “[t]hey do not vote on certiorari petitions, sit by designa-
tion on the Court, or even dine with the other Justices with any 
regularity.”130 Instead, senior judges are relegated to sitting in 
the lower federal courts by designation and performing special  
 
 
 126. See id. at 1458. 
 127. Another potential variable is the utility that judges receive from 
thinking of themselves as judges. Economists have recently begun considering 
how a person’s identity affects utility. See, e.g., George Akerlof & Rachel Kran-
ton, Economics and Identity, Q.J. ECON. 715, 715 (2000); Claire A. Hill, What 
the New Economics of Identity Has to Say to Legal Scholarship (forthcoming 
2006) (manuscript at 2–4, on file with author). I do not consider identity sepa-
rately in this Essay because it largely tracks prestige. Moreover, as with the 
personal factors I discuss infra in Part II.B.6., the influence of identity on the 
utility function of judges can be highly idiosyncratic. 
 128. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 6, at 34. 
 129. See Yoon, supra note 97, at 536–38. 
 130. Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1465. In a famous example of testing 
the limits of the powers of a senior Justice, Justice William Douglas attempted 
to participate directly in the work of the Court after he had stepped down as 
an active Justice. See Garrow, supra note 6, at 1055–56. The active members 
of the Court, however, ordered him to “cease and desist” his activities. Id. 
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projects at the behest of the Chief Justice.131 In the judicial re-
tirement function, therefore, PA is much larger than PS. 
To alleviate some of the disparity between PA and PS, Con-
gress could permit all senior Justices to take on important du-
ties in the administration of justice in the federal judiciary, 
such as the role assigned to Byron White in investigating a 
split of the Ninth Circuit.132 They could also serve as special 
masters in cases arising under the original jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, or serve on committees considering revisions to 
the federal procedural rules.133 Congress should also explore 
whether senior Justices can be better integrated into the work 
of the Court by sitting in place of recused or absent Justices on 
occasion.134 In sum, Congress should think more creatively 
about assigning substantial roles within the judiciary to senior 
Justices. 
Moreover, an increase in the number of Justices participat-
ing in the Court’s business might also lower PA. Indeed, “the 
thirst for prestige is manifested primarily in opposition to any 
large increase in the number of judges, at least high-level 
judges, and to extending the title “judge” to lower-level judicial 
personnel.”135 By increasing the number of actors that have at 
least some direct authority over the Court’s work, it could in-
crease the probability of retirement by potentially decreasing 
the prestige associated with being one of the nine active Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court.136 As with workload and income, 
understanding the interaction of PA and PS in the judicial re-
tirement function will allow Congress to enact narrowly tai-
lored reform measures that influence the retirement decision. 
 
 131. Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1464. 
 132. See id. at 1464–65 & n.397. We also recommend that, at the conclu-
sion of the modernization project, senior Justices should once again be given 
offices in the Supreme Court building. See id. at 1465. 
 133. See id. at 1465. 
 134. See id. The constitutionality of any such proposal would have to be 
closely examined by Congress. See id. at 1466 n.399. 
 135. Posner, supra note 10, at 13. 
 136. It is possible, of course, that being a Justice of the Supreme Court is so 
inherently prestigious that increasing the number of Justices will have a neg-
ligible marginal influence on the retirement decisions of Justices. However, I 
tend to believe that the prestige is attributable, at least in part, to the small 
number of positions available, similar to the reason why membership in the 
Senate might be viewed as more prestigious than membership in the House of 
Representatives. 
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4. Strategic Considerations 
According to the empirical studies, strategic considerations 
(S) and health status (H) are less significant variables in the 
judicial retirement function. The strategic variable S is placed 
in the utility function for senior judges because they might gain 
some utility from acting strategically to ensure a nominally 
like-minded successor, or at least one that is named by a presi-
dent of the same party. Unlike the other three variables al-
ready discussed, however, Congress has almost no ability to in-
fluence S and H because they are inherently personal 
considerations in the retirement decision. 
There are numerous stories about strategic retirement be-
havior by Supreme Court Justices. Justice Douglas, for in-
stance, delayed retirement so that his political enemy, Gerald 
Ford, would not have the luxury of naming his replacement.137 
Likewise, Chief Justice Taft remained “to prevent the Bolshe-
viki from getting control” of the Court.138 With a Nixon presi-
dency looming, Chief Justice Warren retired in an attempt to 
give President Lyndon B. Johnson the opportunity to name his 
successor.139 
Nonetheless, “strategic retirement is a chameleon 
claim,”140 and numerous empirical studies have “rejected the 
hypothesis that Justices retire for strategic reasons.”141 For in-
stance, Professor Squire found no statistically significant rela-
tionship between voluntary retirements and the presence of 
party unity between a president and a Justice.142 Likewise, 
Professor Albert Yoon concluded that political factors “do not 
 
 137. See WARD, supra note 6, at 186 (describing Douglas’s obvious physical 
and mental deterioration and his declaration that he would not retire until 
there was a Democratic president). 
 138. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace D. Taft (Nov. 14, 1929), 
quoted in 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD 
TAFT 967 (1939). 
 139. See Jim Chen, Come Back to the Nickel and Five: Tracing the Warren 
Court’s Pursuit of Equal Justice Under the Law, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1203, 
1249–50 (2002). 
 140. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1435. 
 141. Id. at 1432. 
 142. See Squire, supra note 15, at 184–85. Coding Justices as conservative 
and liberal rather than by party affiliation, Professor Saul Brenner concluded 
that “possibly two of the thirty-three Justices (6.5 percent) who left the Court 
in the post-1937 era might have strategically retired.” Saul Brenner, The Myth 
that Justices Strategically Retire, 36 SOC. SCI. J. 431, 436 (1999). 
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meaningfully explain judicial turnover.”143 While I acknowledge 
that strategic retirement exists,144 it is a small component of 
the overall retirement decision of Supreme Court Justices.145 
Moreover, the claim of strategic retirement must be bal-
anced against the strategy of remaining on the Court. If the at-
titudinal or rational choice models explain the decisions made 
by Justices, then Justices may elect to stay on the Court for 
strategic reasons.146 For instance, perhaps Justice Scalia has 
decided to remain on the Court, despite dissenting in a number 
of cases, because he believes that he is uniquely situated to ad-
vance his method of interpreting the Constitution through tex-
tualism and originalism.147 Recent events certainly do not un-
dermine this conclusion as nominees are becoming increasingly 
hard to gauge due to their short or nonexistent paper trails.148 
On the other hand, Justices may grow tired of losing important 
cases, and may prefer others to do the work. Again, because 
these considerations are relatively unpredictable and lack em-
pirical support, Congress’s attention should be directed else-
where in the judicial retirement function. 
 
 143. Yoon, supra note 15, at 44. 
 144. See Charlie Rose: Interview with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 
United States Supreme Court (PBS television broadcast Jan. 13, 1999), quoted 
in WARD, supra note 6, at 218. 
 145. As we have previously argued, the lack of empirical evidence for stra-
tegic retirement undermines at least one rationale in favor of term limits or a 
mandatory retirement age. See Stras & Scott, supra note 8, at 1401. 
 146. Under the attitudinal and rational choice models, there will almost 
always be a strategic benefit to remaining on the Court because a successor 
will never exactly match the preferences of the Justice he or she is replacing. 
 147. An even more compelling example of strategic nonretirement could be 
Justice Stevens’s decision to remain on the Court, despite his advanced age of 
eighty-five, because perhaps he hopes that a Democratic president will name 
his successor. 
 148. Chief Justice Rehnquist may have been reluctant to retire because he 
feared that his seat would be filled by a nominee without stated views on 
prominent constitutional issues. Indeed, a common criticism of John Roberts 
and Harriet Miers was that their records were too bare to give any hints about 
how they would rule in important cases. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, A Great 
Mind? Miers Might Vote Right, but What the Court Truly Needs is Intellectual 
Leadership, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at 44 (arguing that neither Roberts 
nor Miers promised intellectual leadership); David Stras, The Supreme Court 
Road to Mediocrity, STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), Oct. 7, 2005, at A17 (arguing that 
ideology has become the primary factor considered in appointing Justices). 
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5. Health Status 
Infirmity, both mental and physical, is the single greatest 
disadvantage associated with life tenure. Professor David Gar-
row has done an admirable job of cataloguing the instances of 
severe mental disability among Supreme Court Justices over 
the course of American history.149 The numbers are dishearten-
ing: eleven Justices have suffered from mental infirmity and 
four others from incapacitating physical disability during the 
twentieth century alone.150 
Poor mental and physical health also presumably plays a 
role in the utility function for active judges. For example, Jus-
tice Ginsburg reportedly pondered retirement after being diag-
nosed with colon cancer.151 Although health conditions falling 
short of total incapacity have not been studied empirically, Pro-
fessor Squire found that “major physical disability, like a 
stroke . . . increases . . . [a Justice’s] mean probability of leaving 
the bench in any year by 28 [percent].”152 Professor Squire’s 
conclusion is compelling because Justices should be much hap-
pier performing some judicial duties competently as a senior 
Justice rather than struggling to keep a full workload as an ac-
tive Justice. Nonetheless, because Justices are so resistant to 
retirement even after they have become mentally or physically 
infirm, other variables in the retirement function must be more 
significant, particularly the prestige associated with active 
status. 
In contrast, at least some Justices believe that continuing 
to remain an active member of the Court can prolong their 
lives. In Professor Yoon’s study of senior judges, for example, 
some judges stated that they elected senior status over full re-
tirement because deciding cases and continuing to serve as a 
judge provided them with intellectual stimulation.153 Accord-
 
 149. See generally Garrow, supra note 6 (outlining the history of mental 
decrepitude on the Supreme Court). 
 150. Eleven Justices suffered a serious mental decline during their final 
years: Chief Justices Fuller and Taft and Justices McKenna, Holmes, Murphy, 
Minton, Whittaker, Black, Douglas, Powell, and Marshall. Stras & Scott, su-
pra note 8, at 1437. In addition, another four Justices suffered incapacitating 
physical disabilities before retiring: Justices Gray, Brewer, Moody, and Pitney. 
Id. 
 151. Angie Cannon, The Supremes’ Future, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 
15, 2000, at 18, 20. 
 152. Squire, supra note 15, at 186. 
 153. See Yoon, supra note 97, at 537–38. 
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ingly, some older members of the Court might be persuaded to 
delay retirement because of the numerous anecdotes about 
early death brought on by retirement. For instance, Justice 
Powell believed that Justice Stewart’s early retirement from 
the Court led to his premature death only four years after he 
left the Court in good health.154 Moreover, even a senior Justice 
must perform a quarter of the work of an active Justice without 
the benefit of four clerks,155 which may render it fruitless to re-
tire from a health standpoint. 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that further re-
search on the relationship between health and retirement is 
needed in order to better understand the retirement decisions 
of Justices. 
6. Other Factors 
Although there is no easy way to measure this variable, it 
is clear that other, often uniquely personal factors occasionally 
influence the retirement decisions of Justices. For instance, 
Justice Goldberg retired to become Ambassador to the United 
Nations after his friend, President Lyndon Johnson, asked him 
to serve his country in that role.156 Justice Clark was induced 
to retire when President Johnson nominated Clark’s son to be-
come Attorney General.157 And more recently, the diminishing 
health of Justice O’Connor’s husband contributed to her deci-
sion to retire from the Court.158 
Moreover, some Justices might be influenced by the re-
tirement decisions of their colleagues. For example, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall’s decision to leave the Court in 1991 must 
have been influenced by the retirement of Justice William 
Brennan, his “closest friend,”159 just one year earlier. Likewise, 
 
 154. See DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH 150 (1999). 
 155. Senior Justices get one clerk to assist them with their work. See Tony 
Mauro, It’s Business as Usual for O’Connor’s New Clerks, RECORDER, July 25, 
2005, at 3. 
 156. See WARD, supra note 6, at 169. 
 157. See Michael Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The 
Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 94 (1998). 
 158. See Michael Kiefer, O’Connor Ex-Clerks Surprised by Move, ARIZ. 
REP., July 2, 2005, at A21; Richard W. Stevenson & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush 
Promises to Move Quickly on Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A1. 
 159. U.W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Lawyers, Civil Disobedience, and 
Equality in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Two American Heroes, 54 
ALA. L. REV. 959, 981 (2003); see also Owen Fiss, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood 
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it is possible that the future retirement of either Antonin Scalia 
or Ruth Bader Ginsburg could have an impact on the retire-
ment decision of the other.160 
Like other inherently personal considerations, however, 
such factors are difficult to anticipate, differ among the mem-
bers of the Court, and thus are of little help to policymakers in 
influencing the retirement decisions of Justices. 
CONCLUSION 
The proponents of a mandatory retirement age and term 
limits have underestimated the degree to which the rational ac-
tor model applies to Justices. In making many decisions, as the 
empirical evidence demonstrates, Justices attempt to maximize 
their own preferences, whether based on policy considerations 
or other factors. The retirement decision is no exception. Schol-
ars who dispute the applicability of the rational actor model to 
Justices have either not focused on the persuasive empirical 
evidence advanced by political scientists or have failed to con-
sider all of the variables that touch upon judicial utility. 
In addition to allowing us to better understand the retire-
ment decision, the judicial retirement function and the empiri-
cal studies on which it is based support my hypothesis that 
economic incentives can change the behavior of Justices, par-
ticularly with respect to retirement. Simple initiatives, such as 
increasing retirement pensions and the workload of active Jus-
tices, can change the incentive structure facing Justices con-
templating retirement. This Essay is just an initial step along 
that path. I encourage my colleagues and policymakers in Con-
gress to take the incentives approach to retirement seriously as 
it holds substantial promise for future reform. 
 
Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 49, 50 (1991) (describing Justice Brennan as Jus-
tice Marshall’s “beloved friend and colleague”). 
 160. See Charles Lane & David Von Drehle, Scalia’s Bluntness May 
Thwart His Effectiveness, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at A12 (describing 
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg as “longtime friend[s]”); Tony Mauro, Scalia 
Rumored to Be Chief Justice Should Rehnquist Retire, TEXAS LAW., Nov. 18, 
2002, at 6 (stating that Justice “Scalia’s best friend on the [C]ourt is Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg”). 
